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Although from an economic point of v iew, legal considerations apart, tax 
avoidance, tax evasion and tax flight have similar effects, namely a reduction of 
revenue yields, and are based on the same desire to reduce the tax burden, it is 
likely that individuals perceive them as different and as unequally fair.  
Overall, 252 fiscal officers, business students, business lawyers, and entrepreneurs 
produced spontaneous associations to a scenario either describing tax avoidance, 
tax evasion, or tax flight, and evaluated it as positive, neutral or negative. 
The results indicate that social representations differ with respect to tax 
avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight. Tax evasion was perceived rather 
negatively, tax flight neutrally, and tax avoidance positively. Tax knowledge was 
found not to be correlated neither with tax avoidance nor with tax evasion. 
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1.  Introduction 
From a macro-economic perspective – legal considerations apart - tax avoidance, tax evasion, 
and tax flight have similar negative effects on the national budget. Hence, economists suggest 
to analyze their effects jointly, and no longer discriminate between them (e.g., Cross and 
Shaw, 1982). However, from a psychological perspective it is assumed that taxpayers 
perceive tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight differently, despite their identical economic 
consequences.  
In this paper we contrast the two research positions by investigating social representations of 
tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight. Social representations (Moscovici, 1981; 1984) 
allow a direct comparison of economic and psychological predictions on the same data level. 
Since the economic line of reasoning focuses on the macro-perspective, we cannot study 
individual opinions or attitudes but rather their socially embedded equivalents, the so-called 
social representations.  
The paper is organized as follows: In section 1.1 definitions of tax avoidance, tax evasion, and 
tax flight a re provided as well as empirical research is discussed. Section 1.2 deals with the 
concept of social representations, and in section 1.3 our hypotheses are introduced. Section 2 
deals with the research method, particularly with the participants, the design, the material, and 
the procedure. In section 3 our results are presented, particularly focussing on the central core 
of the social representations, their semantic contents, attitudes towards tax avoidance, tax 
evasion, and tax flight, their perceived fairness, as well as tax knowledge. Eventually, in 
section 4 we discuss the most striking results. 
 
1.1 Tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight 
Tax avoidance refers to an attempt to reduce tax payments by legal means, for instance by 
exploiting tax-loopholes, w hereas tax evasion refers to an illegal reduction of tax payments, 
for instance by underreporting income or by stating higher deduction-rates.
1 Tax flight refers 
to the relocation of businesses, only in order to save taxes, for instance by making use of 
offshore tax havens.  
                                                 
1 In reality however there are many gray areas that do not permit an easy differentiation between tax avoidance 
and tax evasion (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2000).     -4-
Since tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight have similar effects, namely a reduction of 
revenue yields, and are based on the same desire to reduce the tax burden, economists suggest 
not to differentiate between them, but rather to  analyze their effects jointly (Cross and Shaw, 
1982).  However, this line of argumentation  – solely focussing on analytical research methods 
– takes not into account results of empirical evidence on actual tax behavior. The prescriptive 
power of analytical  models of tax evasion (e.g., Allingham and Sandmo, 1972), mainly 
focussing on exogenous variables like audit-frequency and sanction, lacks conclusive 
empirical evidence, indicating that the sole consideration of monetary consequences is not 
sufficient to r eliably describe actual behavior (Alm, McClelland and Schulze, 1999; Baldry, 
1987; Bosco and Mittone, 1997; Cullis and Lewis, 1997; Kaplan and Reckers, 1985; Webley, 
Robben, Elffers and Hessing, 1991).  
There is a substantial body of literature available o n individual tax evasion, underlying the 
importance of psychological factors on the decision-outcome, like framing effects (e.g., 
Chang, Nichols and Schultz, 1987; Kirchler and Maciejovsky, 2001; Robben, Webley Elffers 
and Hessing, 1990; Schepanski and Shearer, 1995), perceived justice (e.g., Dornstein, 1987; 
Kirchler, 1997; Spicer and Becker, 1980; Spicer and Lundstedt, 1976), the importance of 
attitudinal aspects (e.g., Kirchler, 1999; Lewis, 1979; Vogel, 1974), the role of opportunity 
(e.g., Clotfelter,  1983; Groenland and van Veldhoven, 1983; Porcano, 1988; Wärneryd and 
Walerud, 1982; Weigel, Hessing and Elffers, 1987; Wallschutzky, 1984), etc. There are also 
other studies focussing on legal tax avoidance, indicating that respondents believe that the 
"ordinary man" has to bear most of the tax burden (Kinsey, 1984) and they wish to reduce 
tax-loopholes (Song and Yarbrough, 1978). However, while there is a large number of studies 
available either focussing on tax avoidance or on tax evasion, hardly any studies have been 
concerned with the differentiation of tax avoidance and tax evasion. 
 
1.2 Social representations 
Social representations are defined as the sum of socially shared ideas, opinions, and attitudes 
(Moscovici, 1981; 1984). They are a broad defined concept, capturing social reality, and 
having similarity with myths, beliefs, and ideologies. Moscovici and Hewstone (1983) extend 
the concept of social representations by defining them as "common-sense" theories. Thus, 
instead of focussing on individual attitudes and opinions, everyday-knowledge becomes the 
centre of research interest.    -5-
The sum of socially shared knowledge, concepts, and beliefs which are embedded in a social 
net comprises psychological as well as sociological factors. The production and the  function 
of social representations are closely related to one another. Social representations serve as 
means to establish coherence within groups and to allow a distinction between groups. 
Vergès (1987) distinguishes between three aspects of social representations: (i) relevant 
attitudes, opinions and evaluations towards an object, (ii) available information and 
knowledge about an object, and (iii) the structure of emotional, cognitive, and motivational 
factors associated with an object. Abric (1996) distinguishes between the central core and the 
peripheral system of social representations. The central core is defined as a stable, un-
negotiable, and non-transformable part of the representations, whereas the peripheral system 
accounts for inter-individual differences with respect to a stimulus object. 
Social representations are not investigated by questionnaires, structured interviews or 
experiments, but rather in a setting that allows respondents to reply freely, for instance by 
producing spontaneous associations to a stimulus object. 
 
1.3 Hypotheses 
Since from a macro-perspective, tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight have similar effects 
on revenue yields, and are based on the same desire to reduce the tax burden, economists 
suggest to analyze their effects jointly (e.g., Cross an Shaw, 1982). However, from a 
psychological point of view it is likely that taxpayers discriminate between tax avoidance, tax 
evasion, and tax flight, and perceive them as unequally fair. According to the macro-
perspective of the economic line of reasoning, social representations are investigated in order 
to contrast predictions of economics and psychology on the same data level.  
Hypothesis 1:  An analysis of social representations on tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax 
flight allows for a clear distinction between them. 
In addition, we do not only expect that tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight are socially 
perceived differently, but also that they are perceived as unequally fair. 
Hypothesis 2:   Tax avoidance is expected to be perceived more positively than tax flight 
which in turn is expected to be perceived more positively than tax evasion.   -6-
Empirical evidence indicates that tax knowledge is correlated with tax compliance. Groenland 
and van Veldhoven (1983) showed that profound tax knowledge implies low tax compliance, 
whereas the results of a study by Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2001) imply the opposite to be 
true, little tax knowledge was associated with low tax compliance. Eriksen and Fallan (1996) 
showed that following an increase in tax knowledge, respondents consider their own tax 
evasion as more serious, the perceived fairness in taxation increased, and attitudes towards 
other people’s tax evasion became stricter. Since Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2001) report that 
little tax knowledge is associated with low tax compliance, one plausible explanation could be 
that tax knowledge is positively correlated with legal tax avoidance and at the same time 
negatively correlated with illegal tax evasion. 
Hypothesis 3:   Tax knowledge is positively correlated with legal tax avoidance and negatively 
correlated with illegal tax evasion. 
 
2. Method 
2.1 Participants and design 
Overall, 252 fiscal officers, students of economics and business administration specializing in 
auditing and accounting, business lawyers, and entrepreneurs participated in the study. A 
detailed description of the subsamples is provided in Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
The study was conducted as a 3 x 4 factorial design. Independent variables were (i) a fictive 
scenario of a person engaged in tax avoidance, tax evasion, or tax flight, and (ii) respondents’ 
employment groups (tax officers, business students, business lawyers, and entrepreneurs). 
Both experimental factors were between-subjects factors, and participants w ere randomly 
presented one of the three scenarios. The assignment of employment groups to scenario 
conditions is shown in Table 2. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
2.2 Material and procedure 
Participants read one of the three scenarios (see Figure 1), produced spontaneous associations 
to it, and evaluated them as positive, neutral or negative. Before starting the associative task,   -7-
participants were asked to answer a control question about the scenario for a manipulation 
check. Overall, ten participants failed to respond correctly. Their data were excluded from the 
analyses. In addition to the associations, participants were asked to judge perceived fairness 
of tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight (scale ranging from 1 = unfair to 9 = fair), and to 
respond to a multiple-choice test on tax knowledge (see Appendix). 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Fiscal officers were approached during a further education program; students at lectures at the 
university; business lawyers were contacted through large law agencies; and  entrepreneurs 




In the following, free associations of four employment groups on tax avoidance, tax evasion, 
and tax flight were analyzed, (i) for detection of a possible central core and the peripheral 
system of social representations, and (ii) for semantic contents. Moreover, (iii) attitudes 
towards tax behavior and (iv) fairness judgments were investigated, as well as (v) tax 
knowledge. 
 
3.1 Central core of social representations towards tax behavior 
Participants were asked to produce spontaneous associations to the scenario in the 
questionnaire. Overall, 880 associations were produced, 507 of them were different. In the 
condition with the scenario on tax avoidance, 261 associations were counted of which 156 
were different. In the condition on tax evasion, 309 associations were generated of which 182 
were different, and in the condition on tax flight, participants produced 310 different 
associations of which 169 were different.  
Table 3 displays the most likely core elements of the associations on tax avoidance, tax 
evasion, and tax flight. Associations were ranked according to their frequency of being 
mentioned and to their average position in the association process. The program Evoc 
(Vergés, 19xx) was used to determine the cut-off level for frequencies and to determine the   -8-
means of the associations. Only those associations were analyzed which were not literal 
repetitions of what was written in the scenarios.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
Overall, 5 associations were identified as most likely core elements of tax avoidance, 11 
associations as core elements of tax evasion, and 4 associations as most likely core elements 
of tax flight. Tax avoidance was associated with legal, with an intention to save taxes, with 
cleverness and a good idea as well as with costs. Tax evasion, on the other hand, was 
associated with illegal, fraud, criminal prosecution, risk, tax-audit, punishable, penalty, and 
the risk of getting caught. Also, rather neutral associations like income declaration and tax 
saving as well as black money were produced. Tax flight was associated with an intention to 
save taxes, with an impression that taxes are substantially lower abroad as well as with double 
tax agreement and costs of relocation. 
Participants clearly distinguished between tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight in their 
spontaneously produced associations as expected under hypothesis 1. Tax avoidance was 
associated with legality and cleverness, whereas tax evasion was considered to be illegal, a 
criminal offence, and as being risky. Eventually, tax flight was associated with the lower 
perceived tax burden abroad and with an intention to save taxes, but also with associated costs 
of relocating and with the restriction of double tax agreements. Interestingly, tax saving was 
considered to be a motive for all three tax-reduction possibilities, namely for tax avoidance, 
tax evasion, and for tax flight. However, they differ with r espect to the perceived importance 
of that motive. Tax saving was highly considered to be a central motive for tax flight and tax 
avoidance, but was only mentioned relatively late in the association process for tax evasion, 
indicating that the wish to save taxes is overlaid by thoughts of illegality, risk, or by criminal 
prosecution.   
 
3.2 Semantic content of social representations towards tax behavior 
In a further step of analysis, the 507 different associations were categorized. First, four 
experts developed a category scheme according to the associations. Overall, 35 semantic 
categories plus an additional category for those associations that do not fit in the regular 
scheme were developed. Then, three further experts were explained the categories and 
instructed to categorize independently all different associations into the 36 categories. In case   -9-
of disagreement the experts had to further discuss until an agreement was reached. Table 4 
shows the categories and the respective characteristic associations as well as frequencies of 
associations by experimental conditions. The categories "literal repetition of the scenario" as 
well as the "rest"-category were not included in the analysis.
2 
Insert Table 4 about here 
A correspondence analysis on frequencies displayed in Table 4 yielded two dimensions which 
explained 31% and 23% of the variance. The two dimensions divide the data according to (i) 
legality and (ii) to morality. Figure 2 indicates that the produced associations on tax 
avoidance, tax evasion, and tax  flight are clearly differentiated from one another as indicated 
by the corresponding clusters, irrespective of the employment group. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
Tax avoidance was perceived as legal and as moral, tax evasion as illegal and immoral, and 
finally tax flight as legal and as immoral. More precisely, tax avoidance was associated with 
the acceptance of tax reduction, the make use of tax allowances, legal tax reduction, 
horizontal justice, and with tax loophole. Tax evasion was associated with risk t endency, 
peccadillo, intentional evasion, audit and sanction, opportunity, black money, inacceptance, 
unintentional errors, and with vertical justice. Hence, tax evasion again is basically associated 
with shadow economy and is considered as a criminal offence. Tax flight was associated with 
tax havens, negative consequences of tax flight, with flight abroad, bureaucracy, economic 
advantages of tax flight, economic consequences, with unprofitable, with criticism on the tax 
system, and with the wish to reduce the tax burden. 
 
3.3 Attitudes towards tax behavior 
Participants were asked to evaluate their spontaneously produced associations. According to 
these responses attitudinal indices were computed (de Rosa, 1996). The polarity index results 
from the difference between the number of positive and negative associations, related to the 
total number of associations produced by a participant. It ranges from  -1 (negative attitude) to 
+1 (positive attitude). The neutrality index is calculated as the relative frequency of neutral 
associations related to the total number of associations. It varies from 0 to 1.  
                                                 
2 An additional correspondence analysis was run with all 36 categories leading to similar results.   -10-
Two 3 by 4 analyses of variance with scenario and employment groups as independent 
variables and polarity index as well as neutrality index as dependent variables yielded the 
following results: For the polarity index, only the scenario was significant (F(2; 208) = 5.22; p 
< .001), indicating that independent of employment group (F(3; 208) = 0.95, p = .42), 
participants produced most negative associations in the condition of tax evasion (M =  -.26; 
SD = .48); rather neutral associations in the tax flight condition (M = .11; SD = .56) and 
relatively positive associations in the tax avoidance condition (M = .29; SD = .52), as 
expected under hypothesis 2. With regard to the neutrality index, the analysis of variance 
revealed a main effect for employment group (F(3; 208) = 5.60; p < .01), whereas the scenario 
had no influence (F(2; 208) = 1.23, p = .29). Fiscal officers (M = .35; SD = .29) and 
entrepreneurs (M = .31; SD =  .32) produced the least neutral associations, followed by 
business lawyers (M = .24; SD = .27). To the contrary, business students produced rather 
neutral associations (M = .17; SD = .23). 
 
3.4 Subjective fairness of tax behavior  
Participants in all experimental conditions were asked to answer three items on subjective 
fairness of tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight on a nine-step scale, ranging from 1 = 
unfair to 9 = fair. It was hypothesized that despite the fact that tax avoidance, tax evasion, and 
tax flight lead to identical economic consequences, they are not perceived as equally fair by 
taxpayers.  
A repeated analysis of variance with tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight as repeated 
factor and employment group as independent factor indicates significant differences between 
the sample (F(3; 243) = 9.18, p < .001). In all employment groups tax avoidance was 
considered to be fairest (M = 8.17; SD = 1.84), whereas tax evasion was considered to be  
unfairest (M = 2.92; SD = 2.27). Subjective  fairness of tax flight was rated in between tax 
avoidance and tax evasion (M = 6.34; SD = 2.79), as predicted under hypothesis 2. Figure 3 
indicates that fiscal officers generally perceived all three tax-reduction possibilities to be 
unfairer, whereas entrepreneurs considered tax flight to be fairer in comparison to others. 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
 
   -11-
3.5 Attitudes and perceived fairness within the context of tax knowledge 
Overall, participants were asked to answer 10 multiple-choice questions on tax knowledge 
(see Appendix; Cronbach ￿ = .62). In each question they had to choose the correct answer out 
of four possible ones. An index was computed out of the ten questions, ranging from 0 = no 
correct answers to 1 = all questions correctly answered.  
An analysis of variance with tax knowledge as dependent factor and employment group as 
independent factor yields significant differences between the sample with respect to 
knowledge (F(3; 238) = 74.88, p < .001). Fiscal officers scored highest (MF  = .94, SDF = .08), 
followed by business students (MS  = .88, SDS = .12), and business lawyers (ML = .80, SDL = 
.20). Entrepreneurs, on the contrary, achieved the poorest results (ME = .51, SDE = .18), may 
be because they rely on professional advice when tax issues are concerned.  
With respect to hypothesis 3, it was investigated whether tax knowledge is positively 
correlated with tax avoidance and negatively correlated with tax evasion. Our results, 
however, do not confirm this conjecture. Considering the whole sample tax  knowledge is 
neither correlated with the perceived fairness of tax evasion (r(238) = -.06, p = .33), nor with 
the perceived fairness of tax avoidance (r(242) = -.02, p = .80). However, for the subsample 
of business lawyers and entrepreneurs it was shown that profound tax knowledge is positively 
correlated with perceived fairness of tax avoidance (r(56) = .56, p < .001; r(37) = .33, p < 
.05), indicating that the better one’s knowledge the fairer (s)he perceives tax avoidance. For 
the subsample of fiscal officers, on the other hand, it could be shown that tax knowledge is 
negatively correlated with perceived fairness of tax evasion (r(70) = -.24, p < .05), indicating 
that the lower one’s knowledge about taxes the fairer one perceives illegal evasion. 
 
4. Discussion 
Our results indicate that despite the similar effects of tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax 
flight on revenue yields, 252 fiscal officers, business students, business lawyers, and 
entrepreneurs clearly discriminated in their spontaneously produced a ssociations between 
them. Tax avoidance was perceived as legal and as moral, tax evasion as illegal and immoral, 
and finally tax flight as legal and as immoral. In addition, tax avoidance was more positively 
evaluated than tax flight and than tax evasion,  which was least positively evaluated. Tax 
knowledge was found not to be correlated neither with tax avoidance nor with tax evasion.   -12-
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Table 1: Socio-demographic characteristics of the sample 






Entrepreneurs  Total 
N  75  82  56  39  252 
Sex           
Female  34  40  17  8  99 
Male  32  40  39  29  140 
Missing values  9  2  0  2  13 
Age           
M  28.84  26.13  33.43  45.74  31.62 
SD  7.06  6.86  6.17  12.50  10.28 
Missing values  19  2  0  4  25 
Formal education           
Compulsory school  0  0  0  16  16 
Secondary school  45  74  0  12  131 
College/university  23  6  56  8  93 
Missing values  7  2  0  3  12 
Net monthly income in 
Austrian Shillings 
         
< 10,000  0  55  0  4  59 
10,001 – 20,000  51  9  4  9  73 
20,001 – 30,000  11  5  13  6  35 
30,001 – 40,000  1  2  11  15  29 
> 40,000  0  0  26  0  26 
Missing values  12  11  2  5  30 
 
Note: 100 Austrian Shillings equal 7.27 Euro or  6.92 US$ (June, 2000)  
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Table 2: Participants by experimental condition 












Fiscal officers  21  21  33  3  75 
Business students  27  28  27  5  82 
Business lawyers  19  16  21  0  56 
Entrepreneurs  13  15  11  2  39 
Total  80  80  92  10  252 
   -16-
Table 3: Most likely core elements of the associations on tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax 
flight 
Tax avoidance  Tax evasion  Tax flight 
Associations  f  M  Associations  f  M  Associations  f  M 
Legal  15  2.33  Illegal  12  2.08  Tax saving  10  1.40 
Tax saving  8  1.63  Fraud  7  1.86  Lower taxes abroad  9  3.40 
Clever  8  3.00  Income declaration  7  3.29  Double tax agreement  5  3.20 
Good idea  5  1.60  Criminal prosecution  6  2.00  Costs of relocation  4  3.00 
Costs  5  2.60  Risk  5  2.80       
      Tax-audit  5  3.60       
      Black money  5  5.00       
      Tax saving  4  2.25       
      Punishable  4  3.50       
      Penalty  4  4.00       
      To get caught  4  5.00      
Note: The columns f refer to the absolute frequency of associations, and the columns M display the mean of the 
positions of the associations.  
   -17-
Table 4: Frequencies of categorized associations by employment group and scenario 
    Fiscal officers  Business students  Business lawyers  Entrepreneurs 
No.  Category  Tax  Tax  Tax  Tax 
    Avoidance  Evasion  Flight  Avoidance  Evasion  Flight  Avoidance  Evasion  Flight  Avoidance  Evasion  Flight 
1  Intentional tax evasion  3  11  2  3  12  0  1  4  0  0  5  0 
2  Tax evasion based on errors  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  1  0 
3  Intransparency of the tax system  0  0  0  2  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  1 
4  Tax havens  1  0  6  2  0  3  0  0  1  0  0  4 
5  Legal tax reduction  5  0  2  6  5  8  6  0  3  2  0  0 
6  Economic advantages of tax flight  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  3  0  0  1 
7  Flight abroad  2  2  13  1  0  11  1  0  13  0  0  1 
8  Injustice  2  1  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  3  0 
9  Vertical justice  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  0 
10  Horizontal justice  2  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0 
11  Cleverness  2  0  0  3  2  1  5  1  0  0  2  0 
12  Audit and sanction  0  8  1  0  12  0  0  3  2  0  5  0 
13  Individual justification  1  1  0  2  0  0  0  2  1  0  1  0 
14  Personal advantage  1  2  1  4  1  3  5  5  4  2  2  6 
15  Illegal  1  7  0  0  10  0  2  5  0  1  2  0 
16  Peccadillo  0  2  1  0  0  1  0  4  0  1  2  0 
17  Negative consequences of tax flight  0  0  1  0  0  1  1  0  1  0  1  3 
18  Economic consequences  1  1  0  0  2  2  0  0  3  0  0  1 
19  Tax types  0  2  2  1  0  0  3  2  1  0  0  0 
20  Harmonization of the tax system  3  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  2  0  0  0 
21  Bureaucracy  0  0  2  0  1  4  0  0  1  0  0  1 
22  Criticism on the tax system  0  0  1  3  1  4  0  2  1  0  0  1 
23  Unprofitable  0  1  2  1  2  2  0  0  3  0  1  2 
24  Inacceptance of tax reduction  0  0  1  0  2  0  1  9  3  0  4  1 
25  Opportunity  0  0  0  0  2  0  0  2  0  0  0  0 
26  Make use of tax allowances  6  1  1  3  1  1  4  1  0  0  0  0 
27  Wish to reduce the tax burden  1  0  5  0  3  3  1  1  4  0  0  1 
28  Risk tendency  1  3  2  1  12  0  3  4  1  0  6  1 
29  Tax loophole  8  0  0  5  0  1  5  1  0  5  0  0 
30  Acceptance of tax reduction  4  1  4  8  3  2  8  0  1  6  3  1 
31  Black money  0  1  0  0  8  0  1  3  0  0  2  0 
32  Reactance  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0 
33  Tax law  2  2  5  4  2  6  1  0  4  0  0  0 
34  Tax office  0  6  4  4  6  2  0  1  1  0  0  1   -18-
Figure 1: Scenario about tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight 
 
Please, put yourself in the situation described below: 
 
Mr. Paul K. is owner of a successful travel agency. 
 
Last month he has earned an extra income in the amount of 75,000 Austrian Shillings for 
organizing a special event. 
 
Mr. Paul K. considers to make use of legal tax loopholes in order to reduce his tax 
payments. 
(Mr. Paul K. considers not to declare his extra income in his income declaration.) 
[Mr. Paul K. considers to relocate his headquarters to another country in order to reduce 
the tax burden in the future.] 
 
Note:  The expression in the third paragraph without parentheses describes tax avoidance, the expression in 
parentheses describes tax evasion, whereas the expression in brackets describes tax flight.   -19-
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Appendix: 
Multiple-choice test on tax knowledge (correct answers are indicated in italics). 
1.  Austria’s top marginal income tax-rate is? (32%; 42%; 50%; 60%) 
2.  For which of the following expenditures there is no tax allowance? (third party insurance; 
insurance premium for retirement; payments for tax consultants; payments for officially 
registered religious bodies) 
3.  Which tax had to be harmonized after Austria joined the European Union? (local taxes; 
value-added tax; income tax; capital yields tax) 
4.  How does the sales tax differ from value-added tax in Austria? (the sales tax is 10%, 
whereas the value-added tax is 20%; the sales tax is 20%, whereas the value-added tax is 
10%; both taxes are synonyms; sales tax refers to entrepreneurs, whereas value-added tax 
refers to consumers) 
5.  The corporate income tax in Austria is? (25%; 34%; 48%; 60%) 
6.  Which of the following positions is not an essential part of a receipt? (time; date; amount; 
value-added tax) 
7.  What exception allows a financial year to be shorter than twelve months? (a company is 
being set up or shut down; tax authorities gain more insight in companies’ affairs; a 
shorter financial year is not allowed; a shorter financial year can be chosen individually) 
8.  Which of the following legal forms belongs to legal entities? (ordinary partnerships; sole 
proprietors; corporations; limited partnerships) 
9.  When is income tax not applicable? (when the income is illegal; when the income is not 
listed in the codified law; when the income has already been subject to another tax; there 
is no reason that income tax is not applicable)  
10. Financial asset gains that belong to companies’ fixed assets of a limited are part of which 
income source? (business income; self-employed income; income from capital gains; 
other income) 
 
   -22-
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